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Summary An exciting new study on ravens by Bugnyar,
Reber, and Buckner (2016) raises important questions about
whether nonhuman animals are capable of simulating other
minds, rather than theorizing about them.
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The question of whether animals have the capacity to think
about other minds remains a contentious topic in comparative
cognition. Despite over 40 years of research, there is little
consensus on whether any animal other than humans has a
theory of mind. This research originated from a question
posed by Premack and Woodruff in 1978: “Does the chim-
panzee have a theory of mind?”. Despite many elegant studies
using complex experimental designs, the field has generated
more confusion than clarity, probably because a number of
high-profile researchers have discontinued their research pro-
grams or changed their minds about their findings, or because
theoretical psychologists and philosophers with little empiri-
cal training or experience testing animals in social cognitive
paradigms have suggested experimental designs that they be-
lieve will fix many of the apparent problems with animal
mindreading research, but that are empirically naïve. Neither
is the case with Bugnyar, Reber, and Buckner (2016), two
ethologists and a philosopher who have pooled their experi-
ence to design an elegant experiment that gets as close as any
other to providing evidence that (some) animals may recog-
nize (some) mental states in others.
We believe that part of the problem concerning this area of
comparative cognition, more than any other, is the
constraining focus on whether animals possess any aspect of
human theory of mind. Although humans seamlessly make
predictions about what others may be thinking, it remains un-
clear whether we make these predictions by scaffolding upon
perceptual cues, such as another’s line of sight (theory ap-
proach), or by using our own introspection and inferences based
on previous experience (simulation approach). Most research on
animal mindreading has focused on the theory approach, but this
has left a field littered with arguments about whether
mindreading actually occurs at all in animals, and what positive
evidence would look like anyway. The main argument is that
animals would act similarly in response to mindreading or to
behavior-reading alone, without recourse to understanding what
mental states, if any, may drive another’s behavior. For example,
does following another’s gaze mean that a viewer understands
that the gazer is seeing something, or does the viewer simply
compute that the gazer is oriented toward a specific object and,
statistically speaking, is more likely to interact with that goal
object than with another. The simulation approach does not suf-
fer from these limitations based on behavior-reading, because it
is not dependent on perceiving the links between individuals,
cues, and objects. For example, I may open a box in which a
toy snake springs up and scares me. If I see someone I care for
approach the same box, this triggers a memory of that aversive
experience, and I may try to stop my loved one from experienc-
ing the same aversive event. I remember the state I was in while
experiencing the aversive event, and would want to stop it from
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happening to someone I care about. But, isn’t this just my mem-
ory of something aversive, even though it didn’t happen to me?
The key here is whether I would stop someone I did not like
from opening the same box. My memory of the event would be
just as aversive, but in this context, I might want to harm another
or not care about the consequences of their actions.
Introspection, in this case, would stop me from preventing an-
other opening the box, because I would want them to experience
the same aversive event that I had experienced. This has been
termed experience projection, and we were perhaps the first to
find evidence of this in a nonhuman animal, namely theWestern
scrub-jay (Emery & Clayton, 2001).
Briefly, jays were allowed to hide food (cache) in two dif-
ferent trays in two different social contexts—either in private
or in the presence of another jay. Then, 3 h later, the cachers
were allowed to retrieve their caches, always in private. When
presented with the tray they had previously cached in in the
presence of a potential observer, they consistently recached—
that is, moved those caches to new places (a new tray). If
presented with the tray they had cached in in private, they did
not recache. We interpreted this as the birds maximizing
their future returns by moving caches to places that the
observing birds did not know about. However, most
intriguing, and most relevant to the issue of experience
projection, was the fact that we presented these two
conditions to jays with experience of being thieves
(having stolen caches they did not make in a previous
experiment), and separately to jays with no pilfering
experience. Only birds with pilfering experience per-
formed the protective recaching behavior. We suggested
that those birds alone inferred that an observer might
pilfer their caches, and so implemented protective ac-
tions to prevent this possibility. As such, they may have
simulated the future behavior of a potential thief on the
basis of their own specific previous experience.
Unfortunately, there isn’t the space to go into arguments for
why this should or should not be considered experience pro-
jection (e.g., Emery & Clayton, 2008), or most intriguing of
all, why birds who had not seen a bird caching, but had stolen
caches they themselves had not made, should then implement
a suite of cache protection strategies when in the opposite
situation (i.e., potential victims) themselves.
Bugnyar and colleagues took a different approach to the
question of whether corvids simulate other minds. They
adapted a paradigm first suggested byHeyes (1998) to be used
with primates. Heyes suggested that chimps could wear dif-
ferent goggles with different colors to distinguish them—one
pair transparent, the other opaque. If those experienced
chimps were then confronted with other chimps wearing ei-
ther the opaque or the transparent glasses (which could only
be discriminated by their color), then the original chimps
would behave differently toward the newcomers on the basis
of their own experience of the goggles. Rather than make
ravens wear goggles (and all the potential problems that could
cause), Bugnyar and colleagues used peepholes to differenti-
ate between the seeing conditions, so that birds could see into
a caching arena through one peephole, but not through anoth-
er. First, birds cached either when a large window was open,
so that another raven could see them caching from an adjacent
room, or when the window was closed, and a raven remained
in the adjacent room but could not see them caching. Cachers
hid the food faster and displayed fewer revisits to cache sites
to improve the caches if they had been observed caching, as
compared to when no observer had been present. Subjects
were then given experience of the peepholes, by entering the
side compartment and watching an experimenter cache in the
arena through one peephole (but not through a second,
blocked peephole). Finally, the subjects were moved back into
the larger arena and cached when both windows were closed,
but one of the peepholes in the windows was open. The clever
bit was that Bugnyar and colleagues played the sounds of a
raven moving in the adjacent room, from which it was unable
to observe caching. Therefore, the cachers likely perceived
another raven in the adjacent room who they could not see,
but who had the capacity to see their caching through the
peephole. In this peephole condition, the cachers behaved as
if another raven was present and could see them. Bugnyar and
colleagues suggested that the cachers had applied their expe-
rience of the peepholes to the potential for another bird to
observe them, and so decided they should implement appro-
priate cache protection strategies.
Although we agree that this interpretation seems valid,
there are a number of small problems. The first is that the
choice of protective behaviors was completely post-hoc, and
the more obvious protective behaviors did not differ between
test conditions. Speed of caching or checking previous cache
sites are not typical cache protection strategies. Second, and
perhaps most importantly, the ravens’ decisions on where to
cache did not appear to be driven by perception; that is, they
did not tend to cache in locations that a potential pilferer could
not see through the peephole. The peepholes themselves were
quite low to the ground, with a 2-cm diameter, and it is not
clear that the cacher could not see that no bird was present in
the adjacent room. Although they behaved the same as in the
observed condition, this might have been a generally protec-
tive response to a strange situation (e.g., the sounds of an
unseen bird). A couple of additional peephole conditions
could have been more informative, such as ones in which
the peepholes were positioned higher up, and so completely
out of the cacher’s sight, or both peepholes were kept open but
only one had a perch next to it (so that only a bird that had
experience of that perch would recognize that the perch was
the only viewpoint from which a bird could spy on the cach-
ing). As songbirds, ravens should be capable of accurately
pinpointing the location of a sound (such as another moving
raven), so noise played from the back of the compartment
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could have been differentiated from noise at the location of the
peephole. Perhaps in additional conditions, sounds could be
played either at the back or near the peephole (the only rele-
vant location for observing caches).
Despite these minor issues, we reiterate our earlier state-
ment that we believe this study is a significant step forward in
our understanding of whether nonhuman animals think about
other minds, and that it should spark a new focus on whether
animals are capable of simulating other minds.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Bugnyar, T., Reber, S. A., & Buckner, C. (2016). Ravens attribute visual
access to unseen competitors. Nature Communications, 7, 10506.
doi:10.1038/ncomms10506
Emery,N. J.,&Clayton,N. S. (2001). Effects of experience and social context
on prospective caching strategies by scrub jays. Nature, 414, 443–446.
Emery, N. J., & Clayton, N. S. (2008). How to build a scrub-jay that reads
minds. In S. Itakura & K. Fujita (Eds.), Origins of the social mind:
Evolutionary and developmental views (pp. 65–97). Tokyo, Japan:
Springer.
Heyes, C. M. (1998). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 21, 101–114, disc. 114–148. doi:10.1017/
S0140525X98000703
Premack, D., &Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory
of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 515–526. doi:10.1017/
S0140525X00076512
Learn Behav
